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CAMBODIAN NATIONALITY LAW AND
THE REPATRIATION OF CONVICTED ALIENS
UNDER THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM AND
IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT
Jana M. Seng
Abstract: Currently the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") is
indefinitely detaining thousands of aliens who have already completed their criminal
sentences. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
("IIRIRA") allows the INS to detain these convicted aliens while initiating a removal
proceeding for deportation to their native country. Absent from the IIRIRA is a provision
addressing whether the INS may indefinitely detain convicted aliens who cannot be
deported because the United States has no repatriation agreement with the alien's native
country. Justification for the indefinite detention rests on the assumption that the United
States will secure a repatriation agreement in the near future. However, an analysis of
Cambodia's methods for determining citizenship and the lack of uniformity in
international "proof of nationality" law demonstrates that a repatriation agreement is not
likely to occur. For this reason, the U.S. Supreme Court should preclude the INS'
practice of indefinite detention and require an immediate release of indefinite detainees
after they have served their sentence where the native country has no repatriation
agreement with the United States and has not shown a willingness to accept the
detainees' return.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"),t  putting into effect strict
deportation provisions against aliens who have been convicted of crimes that
range from aggravated felonies to misdemeanors.2 The IIRIRA instructs the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to initiate removal
proceedings against convicted aliens and to deport them to their country of
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") was passed by a bipartisan majority in Congress and signed by
President Clinton in response to the public's anti-crime and anti-immigration sentiments. The IIRIRA is an
attempt to slow illegal immigration by increasing the number of border patrols, limiting judicial review,
and introducing new penalties for a variety of immigration control violations. See Trevor Morrison,
Removed from the Constitution? Deportable Aliens' Access to Habeas Corpus Under the New Immigration
Legislation, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 697, 697 (1997).
2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2000) for a list of "deportable" crimes, including crimes of moral
turpitude, aggravated felony, high speed flight, possession of controlled substance, possession of a firearm,
domestic violence, stalking, child abuse, and failure to register and falsification of documents.
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nationality after they have completed their sentences in the United States.3
The Attorney General has ninety days after the removal order becomes
administratively final to remove the alien.4 However, some convicted aliens
cannot be removed Within the ninety-day statutory period and have remained
in INS detention indefinitely because their countries of nationality lack a
repatriation agreement with the United States and refuse to accept their
return.5 The countries where most of the indefinite detainees are from and
where the United States currently has no repatriation agreement with are
Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, or Vietnam.6
The IIRIRA's deportation provision has grave consequences for many
aliens. For example, the INS may initiate deportation proceedings against
convicted aliens without regard to the alien's legal resident status7 or long-
term residence in the United States.8 As a result, many aliens have been
forced to return to countries to which they have few or no ties. 9 Frequently,
the deportation of these aliens results in the forced separation of families °
and may undermine the financial stability of the family unit.1'
Id. § 123 1(a).
8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(1)(A)-(B) provides for the detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered
removed:
[W]hen an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the
United states within a period of 90 days ... [and the] removal period begins on the latest of the
following: (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final; (ii) If the removal
order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the
court's final order; (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration
process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.
8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(1)(A)-(B).
5 See Varied Routes Led Immigrants to INS Custody, SEATTLE P-1, June 17, 1999, at B I [hereinafter
Varied Routes] (giving reasons that include lack of proper documentation of citizenship, fraud in obtaining
documents, and successive government's refusal to acknowledge the prior government's form of
identification).
6 See Barry Newman, Slender Mercies: U.S. Moves Swiftly to Deport Aliens with Prison Records,
WALL ST. J. EUROPE, July 12, 1999, available at 1999 WL-WSJE 18408832.
' See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(20) ("The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the
status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an
immifrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.").
8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a).
9 See Varied Routes, supra note 5.
'0 For reports of the disruption of the family unit as a result of the deportation of convicted aliens
under IIRIRA, see Chris Hedges, Spousal Deportation, Family Ruin as Breadwinners Are Exiled, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at NY Region; Jenifer Hanrahan, Blind Justice; Does Immigration Law Cross a Line
When It Rips Families Apart?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 21, 2000, at D 1; Anthony Lewis, Cases That
Cry Out, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 26, 2000, at 6; Susan Levine, On the Verge of Exile; For Children Adopted
From Abroad, Lawbreaking Brings Deportation, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2000, at Al; Lise Olsen, Old
Convictions Haunting Families Starting New Lives, SEATTLE P-I, Apr. 7, 1999, at A 1.
11 Olsen, supra note 10.
VOL. 10 No. 2
MARCH 2001 THE lRIA & CAMBODIAN NA TIONALITY LAW
In addition, the IIRIRA deportation provision is exhausting
administrative resources.12 Aliens waiting for their deportation occupy jails
and detention centers; currently those who cannot be deported will remain
there for an indefinite period. 13  Estimates of the number of indefinite
detainees held throughout the United States as of February 2001. have ranged
from 3,000 to 4,500.14 Furthermore, deportation proceedings have recently
increased. In 1999, the INS deported 62,359 immigrants for criminal
offenses, an increase of seventy-two percent from 1996, the year of
IIRIRA's enactment. Consequently, indefinite detainees have flooded the
INS offices and courts with habeas corpus petitions challenging their
detention. 15
Using Cambodia as a model, this Comment argues that the INS should
release convicted aliens who have completed their sentences and are being
detained indefinitely because the United States does not have a repatriation
agreement with the detainee's country of nationality. Part II examines the
indefinite detention loophole of the IIRIRA and highlights the case of Kim
Ho Ma, a Cambodian national who successfully sought judicial release from
indefinite detention. Part III briefly describes how IIRIRA fits in with
international standards for repatriation. Part IV provides a history of the
political instability and the rise of nationalism in Cambodia as a background
for understanding why repatriation of Cambodian criminal aliens will be
difficult. Part V outlines Cambodia's nationality and citizenship laws. Part
VI argues that Cambodia's xenophobia and exclusive nationality policies
will hinder negotiation of a repatriation agreement with the United States.
Part VII recommends that the INS release indefinite detainees who have
completed their sentences and cannot be repatriated to their country of
nationality.
II. THE IIRIRA INDEFINITE DETENTION LOOPHOLE
The IIRIRA is silent on the length of time the INS may hold a
convicted alien and the INS therefore maintains that it has the authority to
12 FY2001 Budget for the FBI, DEA and INS: Hearing ofthe Commerce. Justice, State and Judiciary
Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Hearing]
(discussing the fiscal year 2001 budget for the INS).
13 Id.
14 See Florangela Davila, Immigrants' Case Going to High Court, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21, 2001, at
B 1; Monica Whitaker, Laotian in Legal Limbo Tougher Legislation Often Makes Trouble With the Law an
Even Bigger, TENNESSEAN, Oct. 23, 2000, at IA.
'5 Since the enactment of IIRIRA, the number of habeas petitions filed by detainees seeking release
from detention have increased significantly, causing an administrative backlog. See Hearing, supra note
12.
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detain such aliens for an unlimited amount of time.' 6 This has resulted in the
indefinite detention of aliens who have completed their sentences. 17
Contrary to the INS position, the Ninth Circuit held in Ma v. Reno that
indefinite detention is unlawful and ordered the release of indefinite
detainees held in INS custody.'8  Even so, the INS continues to hold
convicted aliens that cannot be repatriated' 9 while the U.S. Supreme Court
20
reviews the issue.
A. The IIRIRA Allows the INS to Detain Aliens Indefinitely
The IRIRA specifically authorizes the U.S. Attorney General on
behalf of the NS to detain 2' and remove an alien from the United States who
has been found guilty of the crimes enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).
The deportation consequence of criminal convictions applies to both illegal
aliens and to lawful permanent residents.23 After a removal order becomes
administratively final, the Attorney General "shall" remove the alien .from
the United States "within a period of 90 days" (referred to as the "removal
period"). 24  Furthermore, an alien may be detained beyond the removal
period where the alien is deemed "a risk to the community or unlikely to
comply with the order of removal"[.], 25 Thus, aliens may be detained beyond
the ninety days after their final administrative removal order while waiting
for their deportation.26
However, absent in the statute is how long the Attorney General may
detain an alien when the deportation order cannot be effectuated.2 7 The INS
16 Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000)
(No. 00-38); see also Varied Routes, supra note 5.
" See infra Part n.A.
'8 Ma, 208 F.3d at 821; see also discussion infra Part II.B.
[9 See Hedges, supra note 10; Hanrahan, supra note 10; Lewis, supra note 10.
20 See Davila, supra note 14.
21 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(2).
22 Id. § 1227(a)(2).
23 For example, an aggravated felony conviction invokes the same strict exclusionary and
deportability standards that apply to all aliens, regardless of their status. See Bruce Robert Marley, Exiling
the New Felons: The Consequences of the Retroactive Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to
Lawful Permanent Residents, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 855,873 (1998).
24 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(l)(C).
23 Id. § 1231(a)(6).
26 The use of indefinite detention to deter repeat offenses is a questionable objective, particularly
when an alien has only committed a minor offense or when a detainee has exemplified rehabilitative
behavior. See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct.
10, 2000) (No. 00-38) (disapproving of the Attorney General's characterization of Ma as a "danger to the
community").
21 Id. at 82 1.
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argues that its authority to "detain [aliens] beyond the removal period"
means that it can detain convicted aliens indefinitely.28  Thus, it is
foreseeable that a convicted alien who has committed a misdemeanor that
renders him deportable can remain in INS custody for life, unless the United
States is able to negotiate a repatriation agreement with the receiving
country.29 Justifications advanced by the INS for indefinite detention rest on
the assumption that a repatriation agreement can be secured in the near
future because intemational law dictates that a country must readmit its
nationals.30
Recently the United States established a delegation to negotiate a
repatriation agreement with Cambodia, realizing that the increased number
of convicted Cambodian aliens would result in an undesirable population of
indefinite detainees. 31  Nevertheless, Cambodian officials oppose a
repatriation agreement. Cambodia maintains that the detainees either do not
have requisite documents, or that the documents are insufficient to prove
nationality. 32  In addition, many detainees have been in the United States
most of their lives, leading Cambodian officials to believe that the detainees
should serve their punishment in the United States and thereafter be
reintegrated into American society. 33 Moreover, Cambodia does not have
the resources to rehabilitate the detainees.34 Thus, the possibility that the
detainees will commit crimes in Cambodia is great since many of the
detainees are believed to lack the family support, language, and relevant
employment skills to become productive citizens in Cambodia.
35
28 id.
29 See infra Part VI.
30 For arguments in favor of long-term detention, see Varied Routes, supra note 5. See also infra
Part I1.
31 Telephone Interview with Jean Christensen, District Director for Immigration and Naturalization
Service, U.S. Embassy in Bangkok (May 10, 2000).
32 Telephone Interview with Nou Hak, Political Consular, Cambodian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
(May 10, 2000) [hereinafter Nou Hak].
33 Lise Olsen, 'Men Without Countries' Create a Class of Unremovables, SEATTLE P-1, Apr. 6, 1999,
at Al. A similar reason was provided by a Vietnamese police chief regarding the acceptance of convicted
aliens ordered deported from the United States: "When they left my country they were small children, they
went to the camps and then they went to your inner cities and became hardened criminals. We don't want
them." Id. Vietnam, like Cambodia, does not have a repatriation treaty with the United States and
similarly has not offered repatriation to the indefinite detainees ordered deported to its country. Id.
34 Nou Hak, supra note 32.
35 Id.
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B. Ma v. Reno
Until Ma, most courts upheld the power of the INS to indefinitely
detain criminal aliens.36 In Ma, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the habeas corpus
petition of a Cambodian native who had completed his prison sentence but
was being held indefinitely by the INS after Cambodia refused repatriation.37
Ma's personal background is similar to that of other convicted Cambodian
nationals who are currently in detention or have been in detention and
cannot be repatriated.38 Most often they are males in their late teens to early
twenties when convicted; they have sought asylum in the United States at an
early age and have become legal permanent residents; most have not
returned to Cambodia since fleeing the country; and most are not fluent in
the their home language.3
When he was two, Ma fled Cambodia with his family in fear of
persecution by the communist Khmer Rouge. 40  They sought asylum in
Thailand's refugee camps, living there for four years before lawfully
entering the United States in 1985.41 Soon after, Ma became a legal
permanent resident. He lives in Seattle, Washington and has not returned to
Cambodia since his escape at age two. 42
When Ma was seventeen, he was convicted of manslaughter for his
involvement in a gang-related shooting.43 Due to good behavior and because
this was Ma's only criminal conviction, he served only two years in prison.44
However, after Ma completed his sentence, the INS found him to be a
"danger to the community" 45 and detained him for deportation to
36 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 279 (5th Cir. 1999) cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W.
3257 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-7791) (holding that long-term detention of removable aliens who have
been ordered deported does not violate substantive due process); Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1057 (10th
Cir. 2000) (concluding that because § 123 1(a)(6) was silent as to any time duration, "Congress intended to
and expressly did authorize the Attorney General to indefinitely detain certain removable aliens").
37 Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 10,
2000) (No. 00-38).
31 Interview with Jay Stansell, Federal Public Defender, in Seattle, Wash. (May 2, 2000) [hereinafter
Jay Stansell].
39 Id.





'5 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) authorizes the Attorney General to detain an alien beyond the removal
period if the Attorney General determines that the alien is a "risk to the community or unlikely to comply
with the order of removal."
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Cambodia.46 Manslaughter is a deportable crime under the IIRIRA.47 Ma's
order of removal became final on October 26, 1998,48 but the INS could not
remove him within the ninety-day removal period because the United States
does not have a repatriation agreement with Cambodia. Ma's family and
friends were also unsuccessful in persuading the Cambodian government to
accept Ma into the country. 49 By the time he filed his habeas corpus
petition, Ma had been in INS custody for nearly two years after completing
his sentence.5°
Ma's petition was one of five cases51 consolidated to consider the
52IIRIRA indefinite detention issue in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Like Ma, many other indefinite detainees are from Southeast Asian countries
that do not have repatriation agreements with the United States.53 In Ma, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the IIRIRA deportation provision as granting the
INS authority to detain aliens only for a reasonable amount of time beyond
the statutory removal period.
54
In light of the Ma decision, the INS released indefinite detainees being
held in the Ninth Circuit.55 However, Ma conflicts with decisions from the
Fifth56 and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.57 Thus, the INS continues to
indefinitely detain criminal aliens within those jurisdictions. 58 The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari to hear Reno v. Ma and resolve the conflict.
46 The determination that Ma was a "risk to the community" was made by an INS deputy director
despite the fact that Ma's manslaughter conviction was his only criminal conviction and an NS report that
documents the strong likelihood of rehabilitation for Ma if released. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 819 (9th
Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 00-38).
41 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).
41 Ma, 208 F.3d at 819.
4' Kim Ho Ma, supra note 40.
'0 Ma, 208 F.3d at 818.
"i The four other cases are Batyuchenko v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (W.D. Wash. 1999); Huynh v.
Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (W.D. Wash. 1999); Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (W.D. Wash. 1999);
and Sivongxay v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
52 See Ma, 208 F.3d at 819. At the time that Ma filed petition for habeas corpus, over 100 detainees
filed habeas corpus petitions seeking release from INS detention. The district court designated five lead
cases that presented issues common to all petitioners and directed the parties to brief and argue those issues
before five district court judges. The five district court judges issued a joint order establishing a legal
framework to apply to each individual case. Judge Robert S. Lasnik issued the opinion in Ma v. Reno. Id.
at 815.
53 Other Southeast Asian countries that have refused to readmit criminal aliens from the United
States are Laos and Vietnam. See Varied Routes, supra note 5.
"4 Ma, 208 F.3d at 818.
55 See Carri Geer, Immigrants Finally Find Freedom, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 10, 2000, at lB.
56 See Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 279 (5th Cir. 1999) cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257
(U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-7791).
5' See Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1057 (10th Cir. 2000).
58 Alex Tizon, Should Sentence Alone Set Captivity? Cambodian's Case Illustrates Argument,
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at B I.
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III. IIRIRA AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR REPATRIATION
Under international law, every state has a duty to admit its nationals. 59
However, each state promulgates its own nationality laws and has discretion
to determine what evidence is sufficient proof of nationality. A consequence
of the lack of uniform nationality laws is that certain individuals can become
"stateless." Thus, to the extent that the IIRIRA relies on the uniformity of
nationality laws to effectuate its deportation provision, its indefinite
detention loophole is exacerbated.
A. The Duty of Sovereign States to Grant Admission to Their Nationals
The principle that every state has a duty to admit its own nationals is
widely accepted as a customary international rule of law. 60 International law
regulates the movement of persons across state borders, and thus imposes
certain duties, such as the duty to admit nationals, on the states so that such
movement occurs effectively. However, it is unclear to whom the duty to
admit nationals is owed. One argument is that the duty is owed between
states and that the duty is a corollary of the right of states to expel non-
nationals from its territory. 6' This right to expulsion is subject to limitations.
For example, its exercise is confined only to aliens, only in the event of the
lawful exercise of states' rights, and only in those cases in which a foreign
62state is prepared to permit the expelled person to settle in its territory.
Furthermore, the extent to which a state is free to expel aliens who have
effectively acquired nationality by virtue of long-term residence is a matter
for debate.63
The duty of admission has also been viewed as a duty owed to the
national seeking reentry. 64  In this context, the duty is corollary to the
individual's right to return to "one's own country" as recognized in article
13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal
5 See infra Part III.A.
60 RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 133 (2d ed. rev. 1988).
61 Id. at 133-34.
62 id.
63 Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN
STATES 201, 255-61 (1978). Proponents of the doctrine of "legitimate expectations" of the alien who is
admitted for any substantial period of time, especially one who is admitted for permanent residence,
advance the argument that such aliens have interests which warrant more protection than those who havejust arrived. This follows the belief that such "alien who is deported suffers a punishment distinctive by
reason of his alienage, and the longer he has been resident in the host country, the greater will be the
hardship." Id. at 261.
64 PLENDER, supra note 60, at 134-37.
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Declaration"): "[elveryone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country." 65 Although the Universal Declaration is
not a legally enforceable instrument, 66 the international community's
repeated reliance on it as a normative instrument has given rise to a
universally binding customary law.67 Furthermore, modern human rights
treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR")68 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination ("Convention on Discrimination") 69 have
developed to give more detailed legal effect to the Universal Declaration.70
Cambodia is a signatory to both instruments.7' The international community
narrowly construes "one's own country" to mean a country in which
nationals or citizens live or have lived.72 This right to return is enforceable
not merely by the individual but by interstate action, such as by court order
or by legislation.73
In summary, international laws such as the. ICCPR and the
Convention on Discrimination delineate the duty to admit nationals.
Cambodia, as a signatory to both conventions and a member of the
international community, therefore has a duty to admit its nationals.
B. Non-Uniform Nationality Laws Exacerbate the IIRIRA Indefinite
Detention Loophole by Creating "Stateless " Individuals
Each state decides for itself what constitutes nationality and how
nationality can be proven. As a result, some individuals may not be able to
demonstrate nationality in any country, thereby becoming "stateless." This
65 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 13(2), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
6 The Universal Declaration is not a treaty and thus has no force of law. Its purpose is to provide
goals and principles that each country should aspire to achieve. THOMAS BUERGENTAL, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 29 (1988).
67 Id. at 31-33.
68 Article 12(4) provides that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(4), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
69 Article 5(d)(ii) provides that States Parties would undertake to guarantee everyone "[tihe right to
leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's country." International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 5(d)(ii), 660
U.N.T.S. 195, 220 [hereinafter Convention on Discrimination].
70 PLENDER, supra note 60, at 134-35.
71 Stephen P. Marks, The New Cambodian Constitution: From Civil War to a Fragile Democracy,
26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 45, 70 n.88, 94 n.152 (1994).
72 HURST HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 56-
60(1987).
73 PLENDER, supra note 60, at 134.
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exacerbates the IIRIRA indefinite detention loophole, which rests on the
premise that every alien is eventually deportable.
1. International Standards for Nationality Laws
To effectuate the deportation provision of the IRIRA, the receiving
state must (1) recognize the nationality of the individual seeking admission
to its territory and (2) recognize its duty to admit those nationals. Thus, the
United States' power to expel aliens under the IIRIRA is correlative to and is
dependent on the receiving state's willingness to grant admission to
nationals.
A state's recognition of its nationals and its duty to admit nationals is
a matter associated with the sovereignty of the state and is thus left within
national jurisdiction. 4 Article 1 of the 1930 Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws ("Convention on
Conflicts") provides that "[i]t is for each State to determine under its own
law who are its nationals" and article 2 further provides that "any questions
as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be
determined in accordance with the law of that State. 75 Thus, international
law leaves to each sovereign state the inherent right to promulgate laws and
regulations as it sees fit. However, limitations to these rights are recognized
in cases where their exercise would be inconsistent with international
conventions, international custom, and principles of law generally
recognized with regard to nationality.
76
The most pertinent international instruments relating to the law of
nationality are the conventions relating to statelessness and discrimination.
The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons ("Convention on
Statelessness") provides that an individual may not be deprived of his
nationality so as to render him stateless.77 A stateless person is one "who is
not considered a national by any state under the operation of its law.' 78
Although Cambodia is not a signatory to the Convention on Statelessness, its
obligation under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights dictates a
similar goal as the Convention on Statelessness. Article 15 of the Universal
Declaration states that "[e]veryone has a right to a nationality," and "[n]o
74 P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (2d ed. rev. 1979).
75 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, art.
1, 2 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 99 [hereinafter Convention on Conflicts].
76 Id. art. 1.
17 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, opened for signature Apr. 26, 1954, 360
U.N.T.S. 117, 136
" Id. art. 1.
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one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality[.],, 79 The Convention on
Statelessness has been interpreted to prevent the same undesirable situation
of statelessness. 80  The Convention on Discrimination is also relevant to
nationality laws.81  Specifically, article 5 emphasizes the need to avoid
discrimination in the treatment of state nationals who wish to cross its
borders.82 Cambodia ratified the Convention on Discrimination in 1994.83
2. International Standards for Proof of Nationality
International law recognizes that proof of nationality is within the
domestic jurisdiction of each sovereign state. 84 For example, article 2 of the
Convention on Conflicts85 establishes that "[a]ny question as to whether a
person possesses the nationality of a particular state shall be determined in
accordance with the law of that State., 86  Typically, an individual who
claims that his nationality entitles him to enter a state commonly bears the
burden of proving his national status.
87
What is considered acceptable evidence varies according to the
jurisdiction. A number of states follow a combination ofjus soli and jus
sanguinis methods in determining nationality. 88 Evidence of birth in the
territory is sufficient in jus soli states. 89 By comparison, proof of descent
from parents that are nationals is necessary in jus sanguinis states, which
adhere to the principle that a child's nationality follows that of the parents.9°
Proof of nationality injus sanguinis states is more difficult. It involves not
only evidence of descent from the parent who is a national, but also evidence
of the parent's nationality. 91
" Universal Declaration, supra note 65, art. 15.
80 THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 307
(Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjom Eide eds., 1999).
8' Convention on Discrimination, supra note 69, at 216.
82 Id. art. 5.
83 Marks, supra note 71, at 94 n. 152.
84 WEIS, supra note 74, at 204.
8' Convention on Conflicts, supra note 75, art. 2, 179 U.N.T.S. at 101.
86 Id. art. 2.
87 PLENDER, supra note 60, at 149.
88 WEIS, supra note 74, at 95. Jus soli means "law of the soil." GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW
AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (6th ed. 1992). Jus sanguinis
means "law of the blood." Id. at 206.
89 Id.
9o Id.
9' Id. at 217.
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Typically, official documents such as a passport or consular certificate
suffice as evidence of nationality. 92  Where valid documents are not
available, another method of determining nationality is the "effective link"
doctrine developed in the Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala).93 In
Nottebohm, the International Court of Justice held that that a person is a
national of a country if he or she has a specific, effective link to the country,
such that there is a genuine connection between a state and the person,
94
The Court defined nationality as "a legal bond having as its basis a social
fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and
sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. ' 95
Habitual residence is recognized as an important factor in the determination
of an individual's effective link to a country. 96 The effective link doctrine
can be useful particularly where nationality cannot be established by
documentary evidence, as is common with refugees who have fled their
countries in fear of war or violence.
97
In the absence of documentary evidence of nationality, international
tribunals occasionally allow secondary evidence of nationality or evidence
from which nationality may be inferred, such as voting in elections, holding
public office, or offering. witness testimony as corroborative evidence of
nationality. 98 The Convention on Conflicts was an early attempt to resolve
conflicts of nationality laws and defined nationality in terms of habitual
residence or other close connection.99 Article 5 of the Convention on
Conflicts provides that "a third State shall, of the nationalities which any
such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the
nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident,
or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears
to be in fact most closely connected."' 00
In summary, although sovereign states have a duty to readmit their
nationals, each state has wide discretion in determining who is a national.
92 Id. at 222-36; see also RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 68 (1983).
13 The Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6). See also VON
GLAHN, supra note 88, at 207.
94 Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 24.
9' Id. at 23.
96 DONNER, supra note 92, at 61.
97 Amnesty Int'l, Nationality, Expulsion, Statelessness and the Right to Return, Al INDEX: ASA
14/01/00 (Sept. 2000), at 14, Amnesty Int'l Library (Bhutan), at http://www.amnesty.org.
98 WEIS, supra note 74, at 216.
99 Convention on Conflicts, supra note 75, art. 5, 179 L.N.T.S. at 101; see WEIS, supra note 74, at.
163.
JOG Id.
VOL. 10 No. 2
MARCH 2001 THE lRIA & CAMBODIAN NA TIONALITYLA W
This discretion has led to conflicts amongst the states. Furthermore this
conflict aggravates the IIRIRA indefinite detention problem by creating
"stateless" individuals.
IV. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND THE RISE OF NATIONALISM: A
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING CAMBODIA'S NATIONALITY LAWS
Cambodia's history is crucial to an understanding of the country's
political instability, exclusionist laws, and social circumstances that hinder
its duty to admit nationals and preclude an immediate repatriation agreement
with the United States. Cambodia's political instability and xenophobia
arise from a history of foreign invasion and serving as a vassal state for
foreign interests.'' Having achieved independence in the twentieth century,
the government has cultivated policies that are based on nationalism and are
arbitrary in practice.' 
02
A. Brief History of the Political Instability in Cambodia
Cambodia's struggle for sovereignty dates back to the thirteenth
century and involves repeated foreign invasions, occupations, and coups by
Thai and Vietnamese regimes.'0 3  The two regimes repeatedly fought on
Cambodian soil for control over Cambodian territory. 1°4 With France's
intervention in 1862, Cambodia secured protection from further
encroachment upon its land but retained only partial independence.' 05 It was
not until almost 100 years later that the Cambodian government was given
administrative control of most state functions and the Cambodian military
gained autonomy within certain provinces.' 0 6  The French continued to
control foreign policy, the judicial system, finances, customs, and military
operations outside of the autonomous provinces.'0 7  In 1953, Cambodia
finally won its independence from France and enjoyed a period of peace and
1Ol See generally DAVID P. CHANDLER, THE TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIAN HISTORY: POLITICS, WAR,
AND REVOLUTION SINCE 1945 (1991) [hereinafter CHANDLER (1991)]; ELIZABETH BECKER, WHEN THE
WAR WAS OVER (1986); FRANCOIS PONCHAUD, CAMBODIA: YEAR ZERO (1977).
'02 See infra Part V.
103 Marlowe Hood and David A. Ablin, The Path to Cambodia's Present, in THE CAMBODIAN AGONY
xix (David A. Ablin & Marlowe Hood eds., 1987).
104 David P. Chandler, The Burden of Cambodia's Past, in CAMBODIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY: THE QUEST FOR PEACE, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMOCRACY 35 (Frederick Z. Brown & David
G. Timberman eds., 1998).1o5 ROBERT G. SUTrER, THE CAMBODIAN CRISIS & U.S. POLICY DILEMMAS 8 (199 1).
106 Donald M. Seekins, Historical Setting, in CAMBODIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 24 (Russell R. Ross ed.,
3d ed. 1990).
107 Id.
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stability until the mid-1960s. 10 8  During that time, the North Vietnamese
forces established bases in Cambodia's provinces operating against South
Vietnam.'
0 9
Cambodia's infrastructure was further undermined when the United
States began a series of bombings, between 1969 and 1973, against the
North Vietnamese bases established in Cambodia in an effort to prevent a
communist takeover of South Vietnam." 0  In 1970, General Lon Nol
succeeded in taking control of Cambodia's government.' Despite
Cambodia's attempt to remain neutral, Cambodia was forced to serve as a
battlefield for the United States and the South Vietnamese on the one side,
and the North Vietnamese on the other. 112  In January 1973, the parties
signed an agreement ending the war and U.S. troops withdrew from
Cambodia. 1
3
Shortly thereafter, civil unrest broke out in Cambodia. On April 17,
1975, the communist Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, defeated the Lon Nol
forces. 1 14  The Khmer Rouge set out to restructure Cambodian society,
including rejection of all foreign influences."15 The Khmer Rouge abolished
formal education, eradicated money, and ultimately destroyed the
Cambodian economy by heavily relying on a communal agrarian
economy. 116  Cities, towns, and hospitals were forcibly evacuated, and
family life was virtually abolished." 7  In addition, the Khmer Rouge
initiated a mass persecution campaign against ethnic minorities,
intellectuals, urban elites, and members of the former regime.1 8 During its
reign (1975-1979), the Khmer Rouge killed approximately two million
Cambodians."
9
o DAVID P. CHANDLER, A HISTORY OF CAMBODIA 173-98 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter CHANDLER
(1992)].
109 SUTTER, supra note 105, at 11.
11o CHANDLER (1991), supra note 101, at 184.
. Id. at 202-10.
112 SUTTER, supra note 105, at 12.
I3 d. at 10.
114 CHANDLER (1991), supra note 101, at 236-46.
"s Naranhkiri Tith, The Challenge of Sustainable Economic Growth and Development in Cambodia,
in CAMBODIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: THE QUEST FOR PEACE, DEVELOPMENT, AND
DEMOCRACY, supra note 104, at 107.
1:6 See CHANDLER (1991), supra note 101, ch. VIII; BECKER, supra note 101, ch. VII.
1 17 Frangois Ponchaud, Social Change in the Vortex of Revolution, in CAMBODIA 1975-1978:
RENDEZVOUS WITH DEATH 151 (Karl D. Jackson ed., 1989).
.S See generally GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY IN CAMBODIA: THE KHMER ROUGE, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (Ben Kiernan ed., 1993); see also CHANDLER (1991),
supra note 101, ch. VIII; BECKER, supra note 101, ch. VII.
..9 MARJOLEINE ZIECK, UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
134 (1997).
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In 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in an alleged effort to cease the
slaughtering of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge's
aggressive incursions into Vietnam.1 20 Vietnam defeated the Khmer Rouge
and controlled Cambodia until 1989121 when international pressure and
political and economic strains forced Vietnam to withdraw its troops.
Cambodians were finally allowed to rebuild their country as a sovereign
state. 1
22
B. Political Instability and Cambodian Nationalism
The foreign incursions, bombings, and revolution destabilized, if not
destroyed, Cambodia's economic, political, and social structures. With the
withdrawal of Vietnam in 1989, Cambodia became a sovereign state and
began the process of rebuilding the country's economic and political
infrastructure from scratch. However, by that time, over half a million
people had fled Cambodia and sought refuge in neighboring countries.1
23
Meanwhile, Vietnamese immigrants continued to migrate to Cambodia.
124
The continued residence of Vietnamese immigrants and the memories of
past invasions gave rise to an anti-Vietnamese sentiment that has pervaded
all levels of Cambodian society. 125 For example, Cambodians commonly
use the term "youn" to refer to the Vietnamese; roughly translated, "youn"
means "foreign barbarian. ' 26 It is also common in Cambodian politics to
treat the Vietnamese as scapegoats for the demise of the country. 27 In fact,
political parties have gone so far as to suggest the establishment of a massive
deportation program in their campaign platforms.128 Thus, what began as
cultural animosity towards Vietnamese and other foreigners has developed
into ethnic background-based nationalism.
120 Seekins, supra note 106, at 6.
120 CHANDLER (1991), supra note 101, at 317.
122 Jennifer S. Berman, No Place Like Home: Anti-Vietnameses Discrimination and Nationality in
Cambodia, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 817, 838 (1996).
:23 ZIECK, supra note 119, at 138.
124 Seekins, supra note 106, at 3. Vietnamese began settling in the Mekong Delta, a Cambodian
territory from the 1620s to the mid-1880s, leading to Vietnam's annexation of that area. Id.
125 Nhan T. Vu, The Nondemocratic Benefits of Elections-The Case of Cambodia, 8 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 395, 402-03 (1996).
126 Id. at 402.
:27 Berman, supra note 122, at 839.
28 Id. at 840.
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The population of Cambodia has been fairly homogeneous, with
ethnic Khmers accounting for the vast majority of the population.' 29  The
term "Khmer" refers to ethnic Cambodians whose ancestors are also ethnic
Cambodians. In 1962, Khmers comprised eighty percent of the population;
in 1981, Khmers comprised ninety percent or more of the population.130 The
Khmer Rouge genocide and the civil war in the 1970s forced many
Cambodian citizens to flee their country without documentation of their ties
to the country. 131  Over half a million people fled Cambodia and sought
refuge in neighboring countries in 1979 to early 1980132 and some eventually
resettled in third countries, such as the United States, France, Australia, and
Canada.' 33  As a result of limited documentation, the Cambodian
government has difficulty verifying the national status of refugees,
particularly those who successfully sought asylum in third countries. 134 In
addition, nationality and immigration laws often preclude refugees from
returning to Cambodia.' 
35
C. Development of Democracy
Cambodia was isolated from the rest of the world during the reign of
the Khmer Rouge and after the Vietnamese invasion.' 36 In an effort to bring
Cambodia back into the international community, representatives of nineteen
countries participated in the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia 137 and
signed a set of accords ("Paris Accords") in 1991.138 The Paris Accords
129 Robert K. Headley, Jr., The Society and Its Environment, in CAMBODIA: A COUNTRY STUDY,
supra note 106, at 83. See also U.S. Department of Commerce, National Trade Data Bank, Cambodia:
World Factbook (May 6, 1999), available at http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/Cambodia/wofact.html.
130 Headley, Jr., supra note 129, at 83.
131 ZIECK, supra note 119, at 138-39.
132 id.
133 Headley, Jr., supra note 129, at 86.
134 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 97, at 14.
131 See infra Part V.
136 David Chandler, Commentary, How to Slice a Century of Cambodian History, PHNOM PENH POST,
Dec. 24, 1999, at http://www.phnompenhpost.com.
137 The nineteen countries were Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, France, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. Paris Conference on
Cambodia: Agreements Elaborating the Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the
Cambodia Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/46/608-S/23177, Annex, pmbl. (1991) reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 174 (1992)
[hereinafter Paris Accords].
138 The agreements signed in Paris on October 23, 1991, include a set of four documents: (1) Final
Act of the Paris Conference; (2) Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia
Conflict, with Annexes [hereinafter Settlement Agreement]; (3) the Agreement Concerning the
Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of
Cambodia; and (4) the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia. Id.
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aimed to "restore and maintain peace in Cambodia ' 39 and vowed that
Cambodia would never return to "the policies and practices of the past.'
140
The Paris Accords sought to end Cambodia's internal conflict by providing
for international supervision and recognition of the country's sovereignty
and independence.141  The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict ("Settlement Agreement") is the
principal accord of the Paris Accords and contains annexes discussing
arrangements of the transitional period, military aspects of the settlement,




Following the signing of the Paris Accords, Cambodia adopted a new
constitution and established a new government.143  The Settlement
Agreement set forth a framework for establishing the new constitution and
provided several human rights guarantees. 144  The Constitution of the
Kingdom of Cambodia, 145 which took effect in 1993, established a
democratic government and enumerated the rights and obligations of its
citizens. 146 The Paris Accords also created the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia ("UNTAC") to supervise elections and provide
stability during the country's transition to democracy. 147 UN peacekeepers
occupied Cambodia from 1991 and 1993, during Cambodia's transitional
phase towards democracy to ensure peace and a fair and free election.
148
Following the 1993 election, Cambodia achieved a short period of
peace and political stability under the nationally elected coalition
government, 149 dominated by the National United Front for an Independent,
139 Id. at 183.
140 The Paris Accords recognize that "Cambodia's tragic recent history requires special measures to
assure protection of human rights, and the non-retum to the policies and practices of the past[j" Id.
41 Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodian Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1993).
142 Settlement Agreement, supra note 138.
:43 Marks, supra note 71, at 56.
44 Settlement Agreement, supra note 138.
14' THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA, in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994) [hereinafter CAMBODIA CONST.].
146 Id. ch. III.
147 Paris Accords, supra note 137, at 186, 189.
148 The UNTAC was considered the largest peacekeeping operation ever mounted by the United
Nations; "UNTAC deployed 15,900 peacekeeping troops, 3600 civilian police, and approximately 3000
administrators and election officials. The UN personnel was supported by tens of thousands of
Cambodians, recruited mainly to help organize the elections." PIERRE P. LIZEE, PEACE, POWER AND
RESISTANCE IN CAMBODIA: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 10 (2000).
149 The coalition of four elected parties included the FUNCINPEC party, the CPP, the Buddhist
Liberal Democratic Party ("BLDP"), and the MOLINAKA party. In a 120-member national assembly,
FUNCINPEC received fifty-eight seats and the CPP received fifty-one seats. Marks, supra note 71, at 58.
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Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia ("FUNCINPEC") party and
the Cambodian People's Party ("CPP"). Prince Norodom Ranariddh of the
FUNCINPEC party led as First Prime Minister and Hun Sen of the CPP held
the position of Second Prime Minister. However, this sharing of power
quickly ended in July 1997 when Hun Sen and the CPP staged a coup to
overthrow the government and declared themselves the governing party. 5 °
The coup resulted in the death of innocent people, unlawful mass arrests,
torture, and intimidation of political parties.' 15 As for its long-term impact,
the coup has not only reversed many of the positive steps taken toward
democracy and economic development, 152 but has plunged the country into
instability and chaos.'53
In short, Cambodia has an extremely turbulent political history and its
democratic system remains fragile. It is against this background of
instability and nationalist policies that a repatriation agreement between the
United States and Cambodia is being negotiated.
V. OVERVIEW OF CAMBODIA'S NATIONALITY LAWS
The Constitution, the Nationality Law, and the Sub-decree on Khmer
Nationality Identity Cards ("Identity Card Law") 154 are the most relevant
sources of law that deal with Cambodian nationality. The Constitution
enumerates the rights and obligations of Khmer citizens.' 55 The Nationality
Law explains, among other things, who is a Khmer citizen.' 56 The Identity
Card Law provides guidance about what kind of evidence is sufficient to
demonstrate citizenship.
'50 See Khatharya Urn, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Cambodia and the Elusive Quest for
Peace, in SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS 71-85 (1998).
"'1 Id. at 71, 73.
152 See generally Sophal Ear, Cambodia and the 'Washington Consensus,' in CAMBODIA: CHANGE
AND CONTINUITY IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS (Sorpong Peou ed., forthcoming Spring 2001).
153 Urn, supra note 150, at 80-84. See also Sorpong Peou, Hen Sen's Pre-emptive Coup: Causes and
Consequences, in SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 150, at 98-100.
' Sub-Decree on Khmer Nationality Identity Cards (adopted by the Prime Minister July 26, 1996)
(Cambodia) [hereinafter Identity Card Law], in LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF CAMBODIA, available at
http://www.bigpond.com.kh/ Council of Jurists (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
... CAMBODIA CONST., supra note 145, ch. III.
t56 Law on Nationality (adopted by the National Assembly Aug. 20, 1996) ch. I, art. 2 (Cambodia)
[hereinafter Nationality Law], in LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF CAMBODIA, supra note 154.
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A. The Constitution Limits Cambodia's Duty to Admit Nationals
Although the Settlement Agreement provides for the right of
displaced Cambodians to return home,157 Cambodia's Constitution limits the
duty to readmit "Khmer citizens" only.1 58  The Settlement Agreement
provides that "[a]ll persons in Cambodia and all Cambodian refugees and
displaced persons shall enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international
human rights instruments."' 59 The Universal Declaration provides for the
right to return to one's own country. 160  Nevertheless, the Constitution is
silent on the rights of undocumented Cambodians, particularly ethnic
minorities, to travel in or return to Cambodia. Specifically, article 33
provides that "Khmer citizens shall not be deprived of their nationality, 1 6 '
and article 40 states that "Khmer citizens shall have the right to travel and
settle abroad and return to the country."'162 Thus, although the Cambodian
government does have a duty to admit nationals to its territory, the scope of
the constitutional duty is limited to "Khmer citizens."
There are two problems with the "Khmer citizen" approach found in
the Cambodian Constitution. First, this approach grants no rights to the
undocumented non-citizens residents of Cambodia. Such an exclusion of
non-citizens violates the ICCPR,163 which states that "everyone lawfully
within the territory" has a right to "liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence. 1 64 The second problem is that the Cambodian
Constitution does not define "Khmer citizen. 1 65  Thus, the Cambodian
legislature was given discretion to define who is a citizen. 66  In 1994,
Cambodia adopted an Immigration Law that detailed the procedures and
requirements non-citizens must meet to qualify for citizenship. 67 However,
the Immigration Law still provided no guidance about who is a Khmer
157 See Settlement Agreement, supra note 138, art. 20, pt. V; see also Universal Declaration, supra
note 65, art. 13(2).
151 See Cambodia Const., supra note 145, arts. 33, 40.
159 Settlement Agreement, supra note 138, art. 15, pt. III. Pertinent human rights convention include
the ICCPR, supra note 68, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the
Convention on Discrimination, supra note 69. See also Ratner, supra note 141, at 25-26.
160 Universal Declaration, supra note 65, art. 13(2).
161 CAMBODIA CONST., supra note 145, art. 33.
162 Id. art. 40.
163 See ICCPR, supra note 68, art. 12(4).
:64 Marks, supra note 71, at 126.
165 Berman, supra note 122, at 821-22.
16 Nationality Law, supra note 156, pmbl.
167 Law on Immigration (adopted by the National Assembly Sept. 22, 1994) (Cambodia), in LAWS OF
CAMBODIA 113-28 (Sok Siphana ed., 1998) [hereinafter Immigration Law].
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citizen. 168 In 1996, Cambodia enacted a Nationality Law' 6 9 in an attempt to
resolve the issue of who is a Khmer citizen. 7 °
B. Cambodia's Nationality Law
The drafters of the Nationality Law sought to evade criticism that
government officials wished to rid the country of residents who were not of
Khmer descent. Thus, the Nationality Law adopted a combination of the
jus sanguinis and jus soli principles for determining how a person acquires
Khmer nationality. Article 4(1) provides the jus sanguinis principle,
granting citizenship to a child "regardless of the place of birth" if the child
was born from a parent who has Khmer nationality or citizenship. 172 Article
4(2) imparts thejus soli principle, granting citizenship to a person "born in
the Kingdom of Cambodia[," including any child who is "born and living
legally in the Kingdom of Cambodia.'1
7
C. Proof of Nationality Under the National Identity Card Law
Cambodia's Nationality Law provides that the Identity Card Law
governs proof of nationality.17 4 The Identity Card Law provides that identity
cards can be granted only to Khmer citizens. 175  Article 4 provides that
government officials shall consider the following factors when deciding
whether to issue an identity card: (1) birth certificates; (2) judgments of the
court stating that such persons were born from fathers or mothers who have
Khmer nationality; (3) royal decrees proclaiming the recognition of the
request for Khmer nationality by the concerned persons; (4) royal decrees
proclaiming the recognition of the application for Khmer nationality by the
concerned persons; (5) documents or evidence proving that the concerned
persons were born in Cambodia to fathers or mothers who were born in
Cambodia; (6) documents or evidence proving that the concerned persons
168 Berman, supra note 122, at 817.
169 Nationality Law, supra note 156.
7o See Sokhet Ros, Cambodia: Nationality Law Gets the Nod After Heated Debate, CAMBODIA
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1996, available at 1996 WL 11707210.
171 Berman, supra note 122, at 821. Human rights activists speculated that Cambodia's legislature
was reluctant to define nationality because it did not want Vietnamese residents to seek citizenship. Some
also speculated that the Cambodian legislature was prepared to deport all of its ethnic Vietnamese residents
back to Vietnam following the enactment of the nationality law. Id. at 822.
172 Nationality Law, supra note 156, art. 4(l).
171 Id. art. 4(2).
"7 Id. art. 5.
1 Identity Card Law, supra note 154, art. 3.
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used to have Khmer nationality, or documents or evidence proving that the
concerned persons were born to fathers or mothers who had Khmer
nationality; and (7) any documents which could prove that such person is a
Khmer citizen. 76  The Ministry of Interior examines the evidence of
nationality, makes a determination, and receives approval from the Royal
Government. 177 Khmer national identity cards are valid for ten years from
the issue date and must be renewed thereafter. 178
VI. MANY CAMBODIAN REFUGEES CANNOT DEMONSTRATE APPROPRIATE
PROOF OF NATIONALITY BECAUSE OF CIVIL UNREST, CHANGING LAWS,
AND CORRUPTION
For the most part, Cambodia's nationality-related human rights
problems are not attributable to a failure to recognize such human rights in
its laws, 179 such as the Constitution or the Nationality Law. In accordance
with international human rights norms, Cambodia's Constitution and the
Settlement Agreement impose a duty, although it is limited, to admit
nationals. Likewise, the Nationality Law provides a relatively broad
definition of who is a Khmer citizen. Instead, the crucial problem lies with
both the Cambodian government's frequent disregard for the authority of the
Constitution, and the power of corrupt officials.' 80 For example, the Identity
Card Law establishes overly stringent procedures for demonstrating
evidence of nationality. This is particularly troubling for Cambodian
refugees who fled the country without documentation and have resettled in
other countries. Many of these refugees cannot provide adequate proof of
nationality by documentation or establish an "effective link" to Cambodia.
A. Difficulties Establishing Proof of Nationality by Documentation
There are several reasons why Cambodian refugees cannot establish
nationality by documentation. The official documentation of some refugees
was destroyed or lost during the years of civil unrest.181  Some have
documentation that the government considers insufficient or old, because the
176 Id. art. 4.
..7 Id. art. 5.
"' Id. art. 2.
179 Marks, supra note 71, at 55.
180 Id.
S' See infra Part VI.A.I.
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laws for citizenship verification have changed over time.' 82 Others have
obtained their documentation fraudulently from corrupt officials.'
8 3
1. Lack of Documentation Because of Civil Unrest
Cambodia's history of civil unrest has forced a massive departure of
its citizens into neighboring countries and abroad, 184 and as a result, many
Cambodian refugees do not have official birth certificates or any other
identification to establish their citizenship.' 85  Over half a million of
Cambodia's residents' 86 fled during the decades of turmoil, and in most of
those cases, citizenship records were lost or destroyed.'87 The 1975
revolution inspired a massive refugee departure.' 88 The Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia in 1979 led to another major exodus of refugees. 189
For those Cambodians who returned to Cambodia relatively quickly,
the documentation problem was not as serious. By their continued
residency, they were eventually able to obtain some documentation, such as
government-issued family books used as a form of citizenship identification
or government identification cards.' 9° However, nationality has been more
difficult to prove for those Cambodians who did not return. As most
refugees who escaped persecution had little or no contact with Cambodia for
years, their options for obtaining nationality documentation became
limited. 191 In short, political instability has caused hundreds of thousands to
flee Cambodia with no means of obtaining documentation.
2. Inadequate Documentation Because of New Laws
Because the current government may not recognize Cambodian
identification cards issued from previous regimes, 92 even those Cambodians
who do possess identification can face citizenship documentation
182 See infrra Part VI.A.2.
83 See infra Part VI.A.3.
184 ZIECK, supra note 119, at 131-38.
185 Berman, supra note 122, at 870.
186 ZIECK, supra note 119, at 138.
187 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 97, at 37.
188 ZIECK, supra note 119, at 133.
189 Id. at 138.
190 Marks, supra note 71, at 78.
191 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 97, at 37.
192 Sotheacheath Chea, Cambodian? The ID Issue, PHNOM PENH POST, Feb. 4, 2000, Full Edition, at
http://www.phnompenhpost.com.
VOL. 10 No. 2
MARCH 2001 THE IIRIA & CAMBODIAN NATIONALITY LA W
problems. 93 The current Cambodian government is generally unwilling to
recognize old identification cards, fearing that the cards were sold to aliens
or illegally issued by corrupt officials.' Thus, some of those who fled
Cambodia with identification may not be recognized as nationals upon their
return.' 95
Furthermore, nationality verification systems continue to change.
Following the Peace Accords, the United Nations established the UNTAC in
Cambodia to create a neutral political environment to hold free and fair
elections. 196 UNTAC supervised the first national election in Cambodia in
1993 assisting with registration of eligible voters.' 97 This system identified
citizens by providing identification cards to Cambodian citizens under the
State of Cambodia. 98  UNTAC acknowledged the citizenship of any
resident who was born in Cambodia or who had lived in Cambodia for a
minimum of five years.' 99 However, following the departure of UNTAC,
the new regime instituted a new identification system in 1999, replacing the
registration papers issued and recognized by UNTAC and previous
governments. 200 These frequent policy changes impose an undue burden on
undocumented citizens to verify their nationality. In addition, such changes
allow government officials excessive discretion in determining who is a
qualified citizen entitled to the rights protected under the Constitution.
3. Corruption and Fraudulent Documentation
Concerns over illegal immigrants fraudulently obtaining nationality
identification have led officials to question the legitimacy of identification
cards, especially when the person who possesses the card is an
"undesirable," i.e., an ethnic minority.2°' Without question, corruption
flourishes in Cambodia, in large part because the military, the police, and
202
other civil servants are not well paid. Although Cambodian citizenship
193 Id.
194 Chea, supra note 192.
"' See generally Controversial Cambodian Nationality Law to Go to Parliament, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Dec. 8, 1995, available at LEXIS, News Library, Asia/Pacific Rim Archive.
196 Ratner, supra note 141, at 14, 21, 25.
"9 Id. at 13-19.
198 Id.
'99 Id. at 235.
200 Chea, supra note 192.
201 See, e.g., Ros, supra note 170. A Cambodian politician expressed the fear that is prevalent in
Cambodia, "[t]here are many illegal immigrants from Vietnam and Thailand and they hold fake
identification papers which are given to them by corrupt Cambodian officials." Id.
202 See General Accounting Office, Cambodia-Limited Progress on Free Elections, Human Rights.
and Mine Clearing, Briefing Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
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requirements are rigid, problems on applications are often over-looked when
the applicant offers money or gifts to the reviewing official(s).2 3  In
addition, the laws are often unclear and applied at the discretion of
government officials who lack basic training and skills to properly execute
the laws.2°
For example, corrupt officials and weak border control have allowed
Cambodia to become a common transit point for illegal aliens and a safe
haven for those seeking to evade the law.20 5 Many pay thousands of dollars
to purchase false documents in order to reach destinations via Cambodia.20 6
Between January and March 2000, Cambodia deported 700 illegal Chinese
immigrants.20 7 When Cambodian police found these illegal aliens, they were
awaiting documentation to enter such countries as Australia, the United
208States, and France. The government blames the influx of illegal
immigrants on police corruption. Others blame this immigration problem
on a lack of training and supervision of immigration officials. 210 As a result
of these problems with illegal immigrants, the Cambodian government has
adopted exclusionist immigration and nationality laws.
211
In summary, political instability, changing laws, and corruption
aggravate the nationality documentation problem in Cambodia and result in
statelessness for many undocumented Cambodians. Furthermore, without a
fair and reliable nationality documentation system, Cambodia is unlikely to
reach a repatriation agreement with the United States.
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B. Difficulties Establishing Proof of Nationality by the "Effective Link"
Doctrine
Absent acceptable documentary evidence, the "effective link" doctrine
can establish citizenship. 212 Habitual residence and sufficient connection
with the country are important factors in establishing an "effective link.,
213
Under the Identity Card Law, residence and a willingness to maintain ties
with the country as important criieria in determining nationality. However,
corruption and the broad discretion given to Cambodian officials are
difficult hurdles to overcome for those refugees who resettled elsewhere but
wish to return.
Each state decides for itself what constitutes adequate proof of an
"effective link" where documentary evidence is not available.214 In
Cambodia, if the resettled refugee has no citizenship documentation,
officials often conduct an interview to decide whether to readmit the
refugee. 21 5  The officials consider several factors, including where the
refugee was born, family ties to Cambodia, when the refugee left Cambodia,
how long the refugee has lived in his or her current country, and how well
216the refugee speaks Khmer. Applicants for new identification cards must
present, at a minimum, proof of former long-term residence in Cambodia,
fluency in the Khmer language, and familiarity with Cambodian culture.217
It may be necessary to confirm former residence by means of testimony
from neighbors or others who can confirm the former residence of the
individual concerned. These discretionary factors can be difficult to prove
and can provide opportunities for abuse of power by officials.
The ethnic Vietnamese's flight from their Cambodian homes after the
Siem Reap massacre in 1993, illustrates the negative impact of this
discretion. After the ethnic Vietnamese fled, the Cambodian government
later prevented their return, claiming that they were Vietnamese with no
history of residence or right to return. 219 However, when the United Nations
and human rights groups such as Amnesty International conducted
interviews to determine the effective link of the individuals to Cambodia,
212 The Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 24.
213 Id.
214 WEIS, supra note 74, at 204. As a general rule, the choice of law in determining nationality is the
law of the State whose nationality is to be proved. Id.
215 Nou Hak, supra note 32.
216 Id. The above stated factors are also considered in the naturalization procedure in Cambodia. See
Nationality Law, supra note 156, art. 8
217 Id.
218 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 97, at 15-16.
219 id.
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they concluded that the refugees had significant ties to the country.22 ° Many
had lived in Cambodia for generations, yet this evidence was insufficient to
the Cambodian government, who claimed they lacked sufficient official
221documentation to prove citizenship. Some had identity cards, but the
cards were issued under previous governments. Under significant
international pressure, the Cambodian authorities worked in cooperation
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
("UNHCR"), and Cambodian non-governmental organizations to create a
register of ethnic Vietnamese refugees from Cambodia.222
The broad discretion accorded Cambodian officials in making
nationality decisions is not the international norm. For example, in other
countries that have experienced an influx of refugees, the countries of origin
have usually recognized that it is impracticable or impossible to verify the
identity of each individual, and have accepted UNHCR or other records as
reliable evidence.22 3 Despite this trend, Cambodia continues to deny such
evidence.224
In short, the "effective link" doctrine in concert with the Identity Card
Law provides a means to determine citizenship without documentation.
However, a refugee's ability to establish an "effective link" to Cambodia
becomes more difficult the longer the refugee is away from the country. In
addition, the Identity Card Law leaves the "effective link" determination to
the discretion of Cambodian officials, who have a history of abuse of power
and disregard for human rights.
VII. CURRENT EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A REPATRIATION AGREEMENT WITH
CAMBODIA
A United States delegation is currently attempting to negotiate an
agreement with Cambodia to repatriate convicted aliens.225 Although
Cambodian officials have conducted interviews with detainees seeking
admission to the country, they have not agreed to repatriate any of the
convicted aliens. The interviews were conducted in the form of a
questionnaire, the purpose of which was to determine whether an "effective
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focuses on the detainee's residency in Cambodia and includes the following
lines: "address before departing for the United States," "present address,"
"occupation and place before 1970," "occupation and place from 1970-
1975," "occupation and place from 1975-1979," and "occupation and place
from 1979 onward.",227 However, it is likely that many refugees will not be
able to establish an "effective link" to Cambodia because they have resided
in the United States since they were young, as did Kim Ho Ma.
VIII. RECOMMENDATION
The Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit in Ma v. Reno and
order the INS to release indefinite detainees who have completed their
sentences and cannot be repatriated. The INS justifies the indefinite
detention of "undeportable" criminal aliens on the assumption that the alien
will someday become "deportable." The INS points to the international duty
to readmit citizens and argues that the United States will negotiate
repatriation agreements with every country. However, an examination of
Cambodian nationality policies demonstrates otherwise.
Cambodia's exclusive nationality policies, political instability, and
xenophobia make a repatriation agreement with the United States unlikely.
While Cambodia's Constitution and its Nationality Law grant the right to
travel and reenter the country to "Khmer citizens," decades of war, changing
laws, and corruption have left many Cambodians without documentation of
their citizenship. Further, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for
refugees who have remained in the United States most of their lives to
establish an "effective link" with Cambodia. Moreover, the broad discretion
granted to Cambodian nationality officials can lead to arbitrary citizenship
determinations. Thus, the INS has based its justification for indefinite
detention on a faulty assumption. Detainees should not be punished for the
United States' inability to negotiate a repatriation agreement or because their
native country is unwilling to accommodate their return.
227 Questionnaire on file with the author.

